Coalition Building, Election Rules, and Party Politics: South African Women's Path to Parliament

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This case, resting firmly in a postcolonial African context, demonstrates that the power and influence that women developed during a liberation struggle may be used to transcend public and private political distinctions within the new regime.
Coalition Building, Election Rules, and Party Politics: South African Women’s Path to Parliament
Hannah E. Britton

This paper argues that pre-transition mobilization by South African women fostered post transition success in constitutional mandates, party politics, and office holding. Informed by examples of failed postliberation gender movements in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola, South African women’s groups worked collectively and individually to advance gender equality. Women mobilized around their gender identity to form a powerful multiparty women’s coalition, which became a vehicle through which women pushed for inclusion in the Constitutional Assembly. Using this external power-base, women’s branches of major political parties compelled their parties’ leaders to implement affirmative-action measures for candidate recruitment and selection. These measures, particularly the gender quota of the African National Congress, have pressured all political parties to increase the number of women on their party-lists in subsequent elections.

Introduction

With the 1994 elections, South Africa moved from 141st to seventh in the world in terms of the number of women occupying seats in the national parliament, with more than twenty-six percent of the seats held by women. This gain was further enhanced in the 1999 elections, which brought the number to 29.8 percent. The South African case suggests that pre-transition mobilization by women fosters post transition success in terms of constitutional mandates, party politics, and office holding. Women’s path to office included a period of multiparty coalition building, a stage of revising the electoral system to facilitate the election of women candidates, and a phase of pressuring the leadership of political parties to advance women’s status through the use of affirmative-action measures and gender quotas. This case, resting firmly in a postcolonial African context, demonstrates
that women’s power and influence developed during a liberation struggle may be used to transcend public and private political distinctions within the new regime.

Based on nine months of fieldwork funded by the U.S. Department of Education, this study compares the South African case with other models in existing international research on how women have mobilized for representation in office. It first explores how women from highly divergent religious, socioeconomic, ethnic, and political backgrounds unified around their gender identity to demand recognition by political parties and Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), the multiparty body negotiating the constitution. Second, it examines how women worked within their separate political parties to implement the election rules and other affirmative-action measures that have been found internationally to be the most beneficial for electing women to office. Finally, it discusses South African parliamentarians’ and party leaders’ reactions to the increase of women in national office.

Path to Parliament

South Africa has had many problems of underrepresentation resulting from a tragic history of discrimination and oppression. Questions of race and gender representation have been and will continue to be central to the legitimacy and stability of the national democratic system. Dene Smuts, member of the Democratic Party, raised the critical question about representative democracy in an interview when she stated: “So I worked quite hard from the time that I came in to establish the idea that on good democratic grounds, there ought to be more women in parliament and in the party” (Smuts 1996). Indeed, descriptive representation of office holders may be a mirror of societal hierarchies and patterns of discrimination, as Anne Phillips asserts: “if there were no substantial differences between men and women, or between black and white, then those elected would undoubtedly be a more random sample from those who elect. Consistent under representation of any social category already establishes that there is a problem” (Phillips 1991:63).

The issue of descriptive representation raises the question of how to get women into office. Within the field of women and democratization, findings on the impact of women’s movements and women’s activism on government are contradictory. Georgina Waylen (1994) compares democratization movements in Latin America and Eastern Europe and finds that women’s participation in liberation and reform movements did not ensure their place in conventional political roles after the transition. Najma Chowdhury and Barbara J. Nelson’s (1994) forty-three-nation case study presented evidence that women’s activism does not necessarily last once a nation reaches the democratic consolidation phase. While revolutions often create opportunities to reform political and cultural systems, they have found that
in most cases women’s political power is not translated into office holding or institutional representation. Until the mid to late 1990s, the pattern of men’s working with women during the liberation as equals only to abandon them as subordinates after the war was pervasive throughout Africa. Women had neither the resources nor the time to consult with one another to learn from their experiences. Cross-national collaboration and strategizing was to come later and has benefited both South Africa and Eritrea.

In many ways the tensions created by women’s position in struggles for national liberation and their position in the struggle for gender liberation are akin to what Karen Beckwith has termed the “double militancy” of women activists. The notion of double militancy precisely describes the multiple locations of women’s roles in the struggles: first as working with the men in their identity group or nation to gain democracy and then working against the men within their identity group or nation to challenge patriarchal control. Beckwith notes implications of this double militancy, including that “feminist activists have to negotiate their feminism within nonfeminist organizations that nonetheless provide resources, contacts, and scope for feminist activist goals” (Beckwith 2000:443). Women must work alongside men to gain liberation, yet the men they work with and the institutions they hope to reclaim may serve to re-inscribe the patriarchal power they also mean to challenge.

Not all comparative research on gender and democratization is so bleak. Several researchers are finding the opposite trend is also possible. As time progresses, women’s movements are increasingly able to have an impact on the creation of democracy and a role within the subsequent consolidation of democracy. These new successes are supported and initiated by a global women’s movement for political representation and voice (Brown et al. 2002:72). W. Byanyima (1992) discovered that, unlike earlier struggles in Africa, Ugandan women’s participation in the national liberation struggle assisted post-transition advances in gender equity, such as the creation of the Directorate of Women’s Affairs, and an increased representation of women at all levels of elected office. Ugandan expert Aili Marie Tripp similarly asserts that women in Uganda have continued to gain voice and strength: “women’s organizations have expanded their agendas to take on women’s rights issues more forcefully, to fight for greater female representation . . . and to publicly broach many different issues—women’s representation in office, domestic violence, rape, reproductive rights, sex education, . . . female genital surgeries, women’s rights as human rights, sexual harassment, disparaging representation of women in the media” (Tripp 2000:657–658). In Eritrea, it is still too early to make a final analysis; however, Sondra Hale’s (2001) study of women using their roles in the Eritrean liberation struggle, and specifically the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, indicates that women are slowly beginning to challenge and renegotiate the gender system within Eritrea.

South African women clearly were operating from Beckwith’s position of double militancy. They simultaneously worked with male leadership in
the antiapartheid struggle to challenge the racist government and bureaucracy; however, they also were developing, articulating, and by the late 1990s demanding a gender analysis within the framework for a new South African democracy. Had they not been as active or as integral to the struggle for liberation, they would not have been in a position to influence party leaders and would not have been in a relatively safe position to demand their voices be heard. They were also able to build multiethnic, multiparty coalitions where none had previously existed, which again may be another outgrowth of their identity of double militancy (Beckwith 2000:445).

The path women followed to the 1994 South African elections provides an example of how a revision of election rules combined with specific cultural and socioeconomic factors to achieve the seventh highest percentage of women holding national office globally. This case, resting firmly in a postcolonial African context, demonstrates that women’s power and influence may be used to transcend public and private distinctions that have long immobilized women in the West. The South African case, however, should not be studied merely in terms of election rules and institutional factors, though these factors were significant. Most important is how women translated their knowledge and influence from the antiapartheid era into a plan of action to secure elected office, constitutional protection, and powerful positions within their parties. Without the specific cultural, historical, and socioeconomic factors of this case, they may not have known about the importance of election rules and institutional factors, or may not have had the power to demand such changes. In a span of four years, from 1991 to the 1994 elections, they moved from the “silent backbone” of the nation to a force of considerable political power and public influence.

Coalition Building

The South African case demonstrates how women can use the political skills, knowledge, and leverage they have developed in liberation struggles and grassroots movements to make themselves viable candidates and gain influence within their political parties. During the liberation struggle, they were essential to every facet of the antiapartheid movement and have long been recognized as the backbone of the struggle (Davies, O’Meara, and Dlamini 1988; Liebenberg 1995; Lodge 1983; Russell 1989; and Walker 1982). Perhaps most significantly, they pushed the resistance movement toward mass action with their protests of the Pass Laws in 1913 and the 1950s (Kadalie 1995; Walker 1982; and Wells 1993). They were active inside South Africa during the antiapartheid struggle, and they mobilized within the ranks of the African National Congress (ANC) in exile. Many women in exile used their international status to pursue higher education or seek military training, which earned them substantial power within the external party structures.

The pretransition unification of women in all sectors of the movement provided the foundation for a post transition focus on gender issues. Women
in exile intended to launch a national women’s movement when they returned to South Africa. This goal was informed by the examples of failed post-transition gender movements in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola, and of successful women’s movements in Europe and the Americas. During my research in South Africa, I interviewed over ninety women who had worked in the movement, many of whom are now in parliament. Through these interviews it was evident that South African women learned of these other models in various ways. First, several women received degrees and training from educational institutions in Europe and Africa; many of them are now leaders in parliament and in their parties. Some completed degrees in democratization, development, or economics. Second, interviewees discussed their meetings with international women activists and academics at international conferences and UN conferences. Finally, interviewees presented stories of political training and advice from these women during their time in the exile camps and military training camps.

Equipped with this knowledge and armed with this ideal, the women envisioned a national women’s movement with an umbrella organization focusing on the goals and needs of women and providing a forum for cross-party and cross-race discussion on gender issues. This vision and process started during the later stages of the struggle, as a former exile, Kimberly, related:

Even before [the end of] the struggle, even before we were free—issues affecting women! I don’t care whether you are a white woman or a black woman or Inkatha or ANC, we must come together as women. Example, 1989: women, mainly three-fourths white women, went to Zimbabwe and called women from Lusaka [in the ANC’s exile] to come and discuss the explosive situation in our country. Women from Nationalist Party [discussing] the role of women! Issues are issues, my dear. When it comes to your baby or your child or even to your husband, they don’t care what party you belong to. [Sifunasonke 1996]

Kimberly describes a turning point for the liberation struggle and the women’s movement. The women were aware of the dangers of postponing the struggle for women’s liberation until after a democratic transition in South Africa. As they had witnessed in international liberation struggles, hesitation could result in significant delays or backsliding for women’s issues. Robin, another ANC MP, discussed how she and other women feared putting women’s issues second to the liberation struggle:

When I started being involved in a women’s section of the ANC, as it was called at that time, there wasn’t the women’s league as it is with an independent structure to decide on its own. So we not only had to educate ourselves on the
issues affecting women, we had to educate the whole movement, because when we raised an issue [relating to gender] it was seen as divisive. [We were told] that the struggle is for national liberation, and women's liberation will come automatically. But, with our interaction with women throughout the world in the various conferences we were attending in the anti-apartheid movement, we learned a lot. There is no contradiction between national liberation and women's liberation. And since there is no contradiction, we felt that we don't want a two-staged struggle. Because our experience is that once you postpone an issue, it is very difficult to bring it up on the agenda again. (Sebe 1996)

Robin was adamant that South African women learn from other national liberation struggles and push for women's issues, even if that put them at odds with party leadership.

The Women's National Coalition (WNC) became an avenue through which women mobilized for action during the negotiation period. Formed in 1991, it is a coalition of women's organizations that united to ensure that women's voices would be heard in shaping the new South African society. It included women of all races, classes, and political parties, and claims to have a broad agenda focused on women's place in formal and nonformal politics, national development efforts, and personal-empowerment activities (Ginwala 1992; Schwartz 1994). Anne Marie Goetz states the “WNC was nationally and indeed globally unprecedented in size and in the diversity of its membership, having over 90 women's groups under its umbrella by 1994” (Goetz 1998:246). Originally, the WNC was the brainchild of women in political parties who had been excluded substantively and symbolically from the negotiation processes. It expanded quickly to include women from “advocacy and welfare organizations, as well as trade union, professional and religious bodies” (WNC 1994:19).

Many of the founders were within the ANC, but the women interviewed during this study maintained that the WNC had been led by women from all parties and became a foundation for cross-party networks and strategizing. However, the unity that was created was tenuous. There were several points of contention among the representatives of the parties, especially those infused with religious implications, like abortion. The WNC chose to avoid any resolutions on those issues primarily because the ensuing dissention threatened to dissolve its unity. It kept its goals focused on crafting a national platform of action, participating in the constitutional negotiations, and influencing the electoral system.

A central goal of the WNC was to create a national women’s movement with an inclusive national agenda. The WNC worked hard to reach representatives of all South African women, yet in many ways its methods fell short of this goal. One former ANC exile, Kimberley, revealed that the process of drafting the platform of action, now known as the Women's
Charter, was not as inclusive as some women had hoped. Specifically, in her opinion, there was a bias toward elite, urban women. While this bias did not lead to the exclusion of non-elite rural women, it led to their underrepresentation. Given this bias, Kimberly still feels the charter was an important milestone in the quest for a nonracial, multiparty women's movement:

When we came as women, we decided we wanted to have one women's organization. Just before the ANC [was] unbanned and then we [were] unbanned so we reorganized ourselves. Then also the question of the Women’s Charter. We brought the women together. I remember very well we called all the other women’s groups together and they said yes.

To be very honest, I don’t think it [the Women’s Charter] reached where we wanted it to reach. We wanted it to reach the rural area, the women who are [in a system of] polygamy, who are deprived and really need it, and the ones who need to abort or not. If we had done that, we wouldn’t still be fighting about this abortion thing. Women would have made their decision, and that would have been that. But unfortunately it [the Women’s Charter] didn’t reach where it needed to reach. We had said when that time comes, we must adopt it and then close the Women’s Charter and then start a women’s organization... Contacting all the people took an elite focus. (Sifunasonke 1996)

This was a significant first step for women in working together and in trying to understand one another’s realities. Women faced the task of reclaiming their power and worth while respecting tradition, culture, and customary law.

What is most remarkable about the activities of the WNC is that its groups were able to maintain a clear focus and a viable coalition for as long as they did, despite overwhelming ideological differences and a history of unparalleled violence, tension, and hatred. Faith Gasa, an Inkatha representative of the WNC, stated, “It is amazing that in two days we were able to sort out very difficult issues. In CODESA, very small issues hold us up” (Pandy 1992:7). Unlike CODESA, which continuously underwent breakdowns in communication and structure, the WNC forged a gender-based alliance that lasted through the elections. Indeed, the WNC is often seen as the only interest group in South Africa “able to bring together groups across such a broad spectrum of political, racial, ethnic, class, religious, and other interests” (Tripp 2000:655).

Coalition building is always tricky business, but coalition building within apartheid South Africa was complicated by a history of distrust and difference. There were periods of confusion and criticism of the movement, as Julie Ballington reports, but in the end the movement was able to sustain unity among its members from 1992 to 1994: “Although there was
much criticism of the women’s movement (focusing particularly on structural weakness, and lack of cohesion and common purpose), the efforts of the various organizations fighting for women’s rights culminated in the national and provisional elections in April 1994” [Ballington 1999b:2]. The WNC also faced challenges of symbolic and substantive representation with its structure. Ultimately, it avoided conducting formal voting because of these inequalities.10

This unity was based on several factors. First, the impetus to form the group was based in the women’s common exclusion and a “fear that women would again be excluded from key political processes that were taking place and which were determining the future of South Africa” [WNC 1994:19]. Women had twice been removed from this process of negotiation: first, within the leadership and control of their individual political parties, and, second, within the multiparty negotiating body of CODESA. Clearly, this exclusion was “an important source of organizational coherence for an extremely heterogeneous group” [WNC 1994:19]. As ANC MP Mary Turok, then a representative of the Black Sash, argued during CODESA, women had a responsibility to force their way into the negotiations: “Nowhere in the world have women been handed equality on a plate; everywhere they have had to fight for it. South Africa will be no exception. We do not want our daughters to turn on us in the years to come and ask: ‘Where were you when the Bill of Rights and the new Constitution were being drafted?’” [Turok 1992:13]. Women recognized this was perhaps the most important moment for their collective action. It was this “urgency” that brought “widely different and often opposed groups of women in the WNC into a distinct constituency” [Goetz 1998:246–247].

The exclusion of women from the negotiations was a trigger point that fostered the creation of a pro-active body with a clear goal and focus; however, that trigger point alone would not have been enough to sustain a coalition. In fact, the exclusion merely served as a culmination of a long history of women’s suppression, silence, and second-class citizenship. It was this pattern of subordination, and more importantly a shared resistance to the pattern, that was a second vital factor for unification. This clarity of the power of the patriarchy was first recognized at the launching meeting of the WNC, when all the groups present “found common agreement about the subordination and oppression of women in South African society and the need for change” [WNC 1994:19]. Here again, women were drawing upon the legacy of women’s activism within their nation. Goetz argues that the WNC was an extension of “a strong tradition in South Africa of women seeking an autonomous organizational expression for interests that transcend party lines—such as the Federation of South African Women formed in 1953 by women from trade unions and political organizations, which drafted a Women’s Charter in 1954” [Goetz 1998:246].

Third, the success of the coalition’s unity may best be found in its exclusive focus on gender issues and a broad understanding of those issues.
These political groups traditionally had been unable to reach consensus, refused to negotiate, and were prone to violent attacks. However, within the context of gender politics and working with only the women of the organizations, these women sustained both their unity and agenda through the highly volatile negotiation period. Central to their mission were two key commitments: a policy of non-racialism and a policy of inclusivity and nonpartisanship. Another key proviso of the coalition was that no group be forced into an agreement or be bound by any agreement that threatened the interest of their individual organizations. What this actually means is that unity of the WNC was not as deep as it professed and in many ways was not as lasting as it hoped to be, because of the extreme partisanship of South African politics. In fact, the WNC clearly recognizes that its main policy statement, the Women’s Charter, does not “always reflect a consensus,” and that signatory groups may “distance themselves from particular clauses, whilst agreeing to the broad principles embedded in the Charter” [WNC 1994:22]. Without these commitments and this flexibility, the coalition would clearly have been fraught with side-debates, and could potentially have been strangled by conflict and inertia. By having a broad understanding of women’s history of oppression and their need for liberation, the groups were able to present a strong, unified, and powerful voice, despite internal divisions and disagreements.

The impact of the activities of women’s organizations on the democratization process was significant. The WNC’s Women’s Charter ensured that women’s interests were recognized in the constitution. South Africa’s constitution has one of the world’s broadest and most inclusive antidiscrimination clauses. The equality clause establishes that neither the state nor a person may “unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth” [South African Constitutional Assembly 1996; chap. 2, sec. 9]. Without the collective pressure and unified voice of the WNC and the women’s groups it represented, the call for non-sexism would not have been equated with the call for non-racism in the constitution (Goetz 1998).

From this external power-base of the emerging women’s movement evidenced within the WNC, women pressured their parties from the inside. Early in the constitutional negotiations, women worked collaboratively to create the Gender Advisory Committee for CODESA. Yet this committee was not enough to ensure women’s full voice or representation. Women became increasingly concerned that the Negotiating Council was male-dominated. Women forced the leadership to add an additional member to each party’s negotiating team, so long as that member was a woman. The road to securing this representation was not easy, but it revealed the sophisticated cross-party tactics the women were using and had developed within the WNC. Surprising because of their history of violent conflict,
women members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC worked together behind the scenes. Caroline of the IFP told me how this collaboration took place:

When they decided to set up the negotiating council, . . . there was only one delegate and two advisors per party, and all those delegates were men, so there were no women. So I went to my own party, and loudly complained at our national council and was told [by our leadership]: “Are you telling me I should change my delegates? Take out the leaders I want to negotiate?” [I said,] “No, I am saying it is wrong that fifty percent of the population is not being represented when we are writing the constitution of our country. I think we should go back and make accommodation for women.” [The leadership answered:] “They will never do it, . . . and I am not changing my delegation.” It went up and down and was quite hairy. [I finally said,] “All that I ask is for permission to try and negotiate for it.” [The leadership answered,] “Go ahead. You won’t get it.”

Then [the women from the ANC] and I played a game. I said, “I’ve got permission now to go ahead. Inkatha will take the lead in trying to bring women into the negotiation process.” [The ANC women’s leader] then went to Cyril and said, “Are we going to let Inkatha take the lead?” I then called the National Party women. We were all . . . trying to figure out what we were going to do. . . . So we got an appointment to make our case to the then all-male council. . . . One by one, they all agreed there would be an extra delegate attached to each party as long as it was taken by a woman. If they didn’t have a woman there, they didn’t get the extra seat. (Behr 1996)

The male leadership of the ANC and the NP did not want to be seen as falling behind their opposition [the IFP] in their commitment to women’s issues. The ANC especially had always tried to lead the way in respect to women’s issues, at least rhetorically. Even today, ANC women often receive exclusive credit for the addition of women to the negotiating table (Seidman 1999); however, this was a collective act. Because the women were working together in the WNC, they were in frequent contact and collaboration. They used one party’s position on gender equality as leverage to gain a similar commitment from another party. They skillfully exploited their parties’ formal statements supporting gender equality in order to force concrete implementation of that commitment. The women I interviewed could trace the roots of these bargaining teams back to their work in the WNC.

Many political analysts in South Africa see this as women’s first major tactical win in the transition period, symbolizing the culmination of their
years of multiparty collaboration. Ballington asserts, “[I]t was here that women are generally thought to have scored a significant victory, through the requirement that each delegation to the negotiations have at least one woman representative” (Ballington 1999b:18). Women’s increased representation was also seen as a significant challenge to the gender system as a whole. When far-right separatists attacked the negotiations, women—and mainly Black women—were targeted.15

Numerically, this meant that each party received an additional delegate, raising each party’s representation to two people; therefore one-half of the delegates were women. Yet managing to secure numeric representation was not necessarily enough to ensure women’s full participation in the negotiations. Goetz has an interesting discussion of women’s strategic marginalization in the negotiations despite their numerical representation. Drawing upon the work of South African activists and academics, she indicates that the women were not included in critical bilateral talks. She further argues that most of the women delegates were from traditionally female occupations, whereas male delegates were from professional careers that had prepared them for CODESA’s legal discussions and high-level negotiations. Most women delegates, therefore, had to continue to use their cross-party bargaining techniques16 and rely upon outside legal experts throughout the negotiations. Similarly, Goetz asserts that once women were sitting at the negotiating table, an act that required collective action, they were again “compelled to toe party lines,” and collective action came to a standstill (Goetz 1998:247).

This research is significant for women’s cross-party work in other contexts because it serves as an outlier. Often, such collaboration is limited because women’s primary identity is within their party, and such cooperation is limited to procedural and not policy-related issues. Here, however, we see not only a procedural focus (women’s exclusion from negotiations), but also ideological and philosophical consensus (women’s history of subordination and need for liberation). While this unity and collaboration have been much more difficult to maintain during the consolidation of democracy, the democratic transition period was a moment when such fundamental needs were acutely visible and unification was possible and imperative.

The collaboration during the constitutional negotiations and the advances they made has been the cause of celebration and collective victory among women in South Africa (Steyn 1998:45). Since these initial victories and the role the WNC played during the transition, however, the coalition has faded from national political view. In fact, its strength became its weakness:

No other constituency had achieved such recognition during the negotiation process, and no single women’s organization had been able to achieve this kind of legitimacy for women’s issues on its own. Ironically, it is this strength of the WNC
that has been a major factor in fueling the constant tensions and threatened resignations that continue to beset the coalition. (Kemp et al. 1995:151)

Because of the limitation of cross-party politics and the ethnic, religious, and class divisions among women, sustaining a highly focused organization has been quite problematic: “The diversity this represents made for an unsustainable coalition, and since the 1994 elections the WNC has been unable to retain its membership or sustain its impact” (Goetz 1998:246). The WNC affiliates have always had to evaluate the utility of a coalition versus the effectiveness of working within their own parties.

The WNC continues to be a source of national networking, and it still has reputable gender training programs but the highly focused multiparty strategizing that marked the 1992–1994 stage appears to have been a unique historical moment in the organization’s history. The WNC’s importance is perhaps linked less to the institution itself and more to the process it fostered. It created the foundation for strategic collective action and established networks that are still being informally utilized between women in government and women in civil society.

Election Rules

Maurice Duverger posited three broad explanations for the gender gap in office-holding: male opposition, female apathy and inertia, and disadvantageous electoral arrangements (Duverger 1955:125–127). R. Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark (1994) dispute Duverger’s theory of male hostility, finding more significant obstacles to be incumbency power, occupational segregation, and women’s domestic responsibilities. They support Duverger’s theory of electoral rules, finding women gain office more readily in multimember districts than in single-member district systems. The consensus of the current literature focusing on women’s political participation and office holding finds that the rules guiding elections are the most significant factors determining women’s access to office (Norris 1985, 1987; Rule 1981, 1987; and Rule and Zimmerman 1994). Three central factors of electoral systems influence women’s representation: ballot structure [such as party-list vs. single candidate], district magnitude [number of seats in a district], and degree of proportionality [allocation of votes to seats].

Multiple groups were working feverishly in South Africa to secure the most beneficial system possible to promote their group interests and ideologies. The majority of analyses of the liberalization and negotiation period argue that South Africa followed Samuel Huntington’s (1991) model of transplacement, wherein leaders of the authoritarian regime and the opposition forces negotiate with the knowledge that neither group alone has the power to determine the outcome. Within this model is a push toward the middle ground, where reformers must appear more liberalizing than the government forces they represent, and the opposition leaders must appear
more moderate than the liberation forces they represent. Within South Africa, Frederik Willem de Klerk and the NP pushed reforms quickly and desired an early settlement, because, “although the government had the upper hand—it controlled the means of coercion and directed the transition process—its strength was bound to decline as negotiations legitimized the opposition groups and reduced the government to a lame duck status” (Jung and Shapiro 1995:284–285). The ANC leaders, whose power was growing gradually, were forced to an early compromise because its base of mass action was “threatening to spiral out of control,” and they realized “that the time for a negotiated settlement was running out” (1995:288–289). The result of this transplacement was a consociational system that “mandated a five-year government of national unity regardless of the election outcome, with cabinet representation for all parties that won at least 5 percent of the vote and a share of executive power for the strongest minority party” (1995: 291).21

What these analyses underestimate, and even ignore, is the power and influence wielded by organized social movements within South Africa during the negotiations. Glenn Adler and Eddie Webster have undertaken the most substantive analysis of this kind in their examination of the role and influence of the labor movement in the negotiations: while acknowledging that mainstream transition literature is applicable to South Africa, they argue that “its emphasis on elites leads it to misunderstand the role of popular movements and struggle in the origin, development, and outcome of actual transitions” (Adler and Webster 1995:76). They denote a new strategy they call “radical reform,” in which “disciplined and sophisticated social movements may be able to inject more progressive content into the democratization process and wrest important concessions from reformers and moderates alike” (1995:76).

Applying this notion of radical reform to the South African case, Adler and Webster assert “a mobilized civil society and powerful social movements—especially the labor movement—played a central and constructive role in creating the conditions for the transition, in shaping its character, and indeed in legitimizing the transition process itself” (Adler and Webster 1995:76–77). A similar case is seen within the mobilization and influence of the women’s movement, building on the work of the WNC and a long history of women’s activism within the struggle. With the guidance, support, and consultation of women activists in the Gender Advisory Committee of CODESA, South Africa adopted a multimember-district electoral system, which utilizes party-list-proportional representation (Ballington 1999b), the system found most likely to enhance women’s representation cross-nationally (Castles 1981; Duverger 1955; Lakeman 1970; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Matland 1993; Norris 1985, 1987; and Rule 1981, 1987). During this period, many forces were working to select the election process, and it is arguable that this system would have developed without the input of the women in political parties or the women in the WNC. During the negotiation period, gender consultants not only researched international systems to
determine the most beneficial for women’s representation, but also queried academics and activists internationally to determine which system would be best and why. They found that the “list proportional representation system, especially closed lists, allows political parties considerable influence over who is represented. . . . Parties wishing to appeal to a wide constituency will find it necessary to put up candidates who reflect the composition of the electorate. For this reason lists can work to the advantage of women, as with the ANC’s adopted quota system” (Ballington 1999b:18).

The multimember-district system has benefited women candidates because, when people are voting for a party-list of candidates, party leaders are more apt to provide a diverse candidate pool so as to attract a diverse number of voters. In the alternative system, which involves voting for a single individual for a specific seat, party leaders are less likely to support a female candidate: she may seem like a political risk, or, in any case, will occupy the only seat the party wins. Therefore, a party will run a greater number of women candidates if a larger number of seats is at stake.\textsuperscript{22}

Beyond the advantages for women’s representation, the multimember-district system with party-lists offers the best chance for descriptive and substantive representation for ethnic groups and minority parties. Andrew Reynolds discusses why this system has been successful in South Africa in terms of representation and why this structure has been beneficial in preventing fragmentation, polarization, and disunity within a historically contentious political climate. Since the multimember-district system allows smaller parties a voice in parliament, they are less likely to be co-opted by extremist elements and less likely to push for isolationism or secession. He argues that “divided societies need proportional representation rather than plurality elections. . . . If minorities are to accept Parliament, they must be adequately represented in Parliament” (Reynolds 1995:86–87). This would clearly not have been the case had the interim constitution implemented single-member districts within a winner-take-all system, like the first-past-the-post system found in the United States. Such a system would have excluded minority parties from taking office, decreased descriptive and substantive representation, and potentially increased hostility and fragmentation. As with gender, the closed party-lists “allowed parties to present ethnically heterogeneous groups of candidates with anticipated cross-cutting appeal” (Reynolds 1995:91).

\textit{Party Politics}

The WNC was just one element in women’s struggle to advance their collective political voice. Another central factor was influencing and shaping internal party politics. Women strategically used the growing presence of a national women’s movement to pressure their parties to act on their behalf. The ANC Women’s League is perhaps the most successful and notable example of the process of advancing women candidates within the party. By using the power of women’s collective identity as a challenge to
ANC dominance, the ANC Women’s League secured a commitment to have a third of the ANC seats in parliament reserved for women. In many ways, women’s activism within the ANC party structure parallels a model developed by Joni Lovenduski (1993) and based on case studies of European nations, in which Lovenduski finds four stages of the gender transformation of party politics. First, women place gender issues on the party agenda, often securing only a formal, rhetorical commitment from the party leadership. Second, women ease the integration of women’s issues into party politics by emphasizing the universality of their demands. Robin of the ANC explained this linkage between women’s rights and human rights:

> We started pushing for the two struggles [of national liberation and women’s liberation] to go together, to say that you cannot obtain national liberation without women’s liberation. And that started taking root, especially first among the leadership of the ANC itself. The leadership of that time, Oliver Tambo, who started articulating the same position and [so did the] other leaders [of the time], the President[, Nelson Mandela,] and the Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, and the present Minister of Public Service—who later on actually headed the Constitutional Committee of the ANC. So all this had been conceptualized. Then we were able to push issues affecting women, even to make sure that whatever constitutional issues were being considered are taken on board. (Sebe 1996)

Although she was almost certainly not aware of Lovenduski’s model, Robin reveals that she and the other members of her party followed the model’s first two steps almost exactly. They first ideologically linked the struggles for racial equality and gender equality and then pressured their leadership to make public statements in support of women’s liberation.23

In the third stage of the Lovenduski model, women worked within parties and external networks simultaneously. This collaboration is necessary to support powerful party women’s strength, influence, and agency and because “political parties moved on women’s issues when they were pressed to do so” (1993:5). As previously demonstrated, party women were able to assert their gender agenda because of the growing national power and influence of the WNC. From this position of influence, women could then pressure for an alteration in the formal party rules or practices to increase their participation, representation, and influence—the fourth stage of the Lovenduski model. In Europe, these practices often took the form of affirmative-action measures within the party, such as special training and mentoring for women members, or gender targets for internal party positions or candidate lists. In an increasing number of instances, the electoral rules were altered through positive discriminatory measures, namely gender quotas.
The implementation of a gender quota was the exact measure the ANC women secured, obtaining a commitment from the party leadership that they would reserve thirty percent of the seats on the party’s national election list for women. Women from all parties were conversant with the literature on, and results of, gender quotas. Quotas are seen as the most direct and immediate means for addressing the significant gender imbalance within national legislatures and parliaments (Jones 1996, 1998; Rule and Zimmerman 1994). Phillips has found that the use of quotas for women in Nordic countries has made “gender . . . less intransigent than class” (1991: 89). The implementation of quotas and targets is much less difficult than attempting broader societal transformations at the level of political, cultural, or socioeconomic structures (Norris 1996). Marc P. Jones (1998) finds that the national gender laws in Argentina have had a significant impact on the percentage of women elected, with the most successful results in provincial legislatures employing closed party-lists.

The symbolic importance of women’s influx into national office in 1994 was immediately felt. Maria, a member of a primarily white opposition party, discussed women’s influx into office within the context of international quotas:

It was a quota, simple matter of a quota system. Been to lots of international conferences, women’s conference where this has been addressed, what works. And the conclusion across the board, whether it is Christian Democrat or Tory type, or whether it is social-democrat, socialist-type parties. The socialists are the ones who implement quota systems, and the Tory party-bosses appear quite critical of it. But the women in those parties say it is the only thing that works. Because they have been asking for better deals and promised the world, and there has been no delivery or very little delivery, and in the end concluded that quotas work and nothing else much does. And I think you have seen that in other countries. We have twenty five percent women because the ANC [commitment for] thirty three and a third percent. (Van Rooyen 1997)

There were similar struggles to achieve gender equity within other parties. As Dene Smuts, the only female Member of Parliament for the Democratic Party in 1994–1999, relates, her party has had a unique history of gender representation. Helen Suzman was the sole representative of her party during the apartheid years. Despite the strength and outspokenness of Suzman’s leadership, achieving women’s equity in her party as a whole has been an uphill battle; however, once women linked the need for gender representation to the party’s philosophy of sound democratic governance, the party leaders were supportive. Further, now that all parties are working to gain a larger percentage of seats in parliament, there is even more of a reason to have women on the lists:
This party, in its previous incarnation as the PFP [Progressive Federal Party], for a long stretch of its existence, it had a single member of parliament, Ms. Suzman. And she was very famous because she was the lone voice against apartheid and so on. So, by no stretch of the imagination can it be accused of being a party either in this or previous incarnations that was antagonistic to women or didn’t see them as MPs. I always make the crack that at one time one hundred percent of our party representation was female.

Having said that, the idea of being women in numbers . . . until I see the numbers, I am still looking at an exception that makes a rule. So I worked quite hard from the time that I came in to establish the idea that on good democratic grounds, there ought to be more women in parliament and in the party. Let’s be frank, the party at that stage was still in the pattern of thinking that applies everywhere in the world: that an MP was unconsciously thought of as someone who was male, in a suit, a breadwinner.

Together with women in the party, . . . we plugged away at this idea for a few years. At every congress, we did our best, and certainly there was resistance. There was even one congress where someone snickered. You see, we have all been there. . . . Within a few years flat, the idea was fully accepted, and no one would dream of dissenting now, and the way we approach it as a party, since we don’t believe in lists and quotas and so forth, we take it upon ourselves to make sure that good women candidates are encouraged to come forward. . . .

I think it was in ’93 the other parties in parliament had also gotten the message. There were women out there with votes who took women’s issues seriously. And, when you argue it like that, votes, boy, do they fall in line fast. They were making feminist speeches in here like you wouldn’t believe it. So, formally, the battle was long won, and the only question was whether informally discrimination still operates. [Smuts 1996]

The women interviewed who were central to the negotiations maintained repeatedly that obtaining the quota would not have been possible without the external threat and pressure of the emerging women's movement. Additionally, South African women had sought the advice of international electoral scholars and women activists who had undergone similar transitions. Each group had advised the South Africans to make these changes and secure the quota before the first election. Had they waited until after the first election, male incumbents would have been much less likely to relinquish their seats or their positions on the party lists. For example, South African women and policy groups consulted Darcy on the issues of electoral
rules, quotas, and gender equity. Darcy argued that South African women could make “more progress in five months than in the next 10 years in their efforts to gain political representation” if they secured the appropriate affirmative action measure and quotas before the 1994 elections, because “the point at which a country draws up its constitution or redefines its electoral laws is the point at which women, if well organized and clear in their demands, could secure meaningful political gains,” and women who gained access when national rules were changing found an ideal time “to level the playing field and find ways of taking away incumbent’s privileges” [Darcy 1993:21].

Two members of the South African parliament echoed this sentiment, stating the gains they made during these societal shifts would have been impossible in a normal system. A member of an opposition party remarked: “One of the good things about a society in a complete transition, it is turmoil, but you make strides that it would take decades in the States, in [the] U.K., in France, because the whole society is reinventing itself. It is exhilarating.” Sarah of the ANC indicated how much the party’s women were able to achieve during this transition period, not just for race and gender, but also for sexual orientation:

I always say the one nice thing about being in politics now is that the carpet was pretty much pulled out from under everybody in this country. So everything is up for grabs; everything is being changed. Even the Americans who have this incredibly long history of human rights and fundamental rights—but, for example, gay marriages, which is now the big fuss in America, when people come here and argue about it, we look at them. I think we are going to have it. It is now in the Bill of Rights. I was surprised, because inherently this is a conservative country, not this major liberal left wing. And it is not even that the ANC is that: it is a fairly conservative organization, religious. But I think of this thing when you change, you change your whole paradigm, not a gradual thing, whole thing happening in two years. You take basically the whole framework out, and you put a basically whole new one in. That is what is so exciting about being here—not that rigid old process. [Meyer 1996]

Sarah is aware that the transition was momentous in terms of racial power shifts and in terms of the opportunities for women’s issues and gay rights. She is also aware this would not have been possible under normal governmental reforms and legislation. The nation was and remains conservative and religious. For these women, the goal may not be to see how much more they can achieve, but rather to see how many changes they can maintain once the transition is complete.

Even more can be learned about the internal politics of the parties themselves by looking at the composition of the party-lists. The ANC led
the way with the implementation of a gender quota. On the 1994 election
lists (see Table 3), it committed to having thirty percent women on the list
as a whole, but without specifications on how the women would fall in that
list. It ranked only a handful of women at the top of the list. This fact is
often overlooked in respect to the ANC because they won so many seats.
Thus, many women were brought into office because the chance of the ANC
winning seats was so high. Having a low rank was not purely detrimental,
as it was in other parties.

Although the ANC was the only party to implement a voluntary quota
in 1994, most parties did work to encourage female representation in some
form. During the 1994 elections, more than thirty percent of the national
party-list of the Democratic Party (DP) were women; however, those on the
list were ranked low and therefore had little chance of being elected. The
Inkatha Freedom Party, much like the DP, asserted that a quota was unnec-
essary, given the party’s commitment to non-sexism. The IFP Women’s
Brigade is a powerful force within the party, and several prominent women
figures are in the IFP; however, unlike the DP, the IFP had only ten percent
women on its national list, but had 15.9 percent on its regional lists, and
its total percentage of women Members of Parliament for 1994 was twenty-
three. Similarly, the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) did not
have a specific gender policy for its party-list, and women “were not placed
in winnable positions, as the first woman was placed at number 15 on
the list” [Ballington 1999b:12]. The same can be said for the Pan-Africanist
Congress (PAC), which asserted a policy of equality, but only had twelve
percent women on each of their national and regional party lists.

An interesting example of the politics of parties with ties to the old
dispensation is the Freedom Front (FF), a far-right Afrikaner party. Cre-
ated during the transition to the 1994 elections, it was initially opposed to
participating in the elections, and was determined to pursue an Afrikaner
homeland (volkstaat) as a first priority. By the time it had decided to par-
ticipate in the election, it did not have enough time to have a consultative
process for creating a national list, and instead, “those individuals who
had already held seats in Parliament were placed at the top of the list”
[Ballington 1999b:14]. The party had more time to create lists for the lower
levels of government, which is where the party is most focused because of
its dedication to federalism and the denationalization of politics.

Much like the DP and IFP, the National Party (NP) is as adamantly
against a quota system. The NP did not compile a national list for election
in the 1994 election and used only the regional lists. Ballington asserts that
an “examination of the candidates’ lists submitted by the party reveals that
women did not feature prominently [, averaging only eleven percent]. . . .
It is clear that the NP was not committed to a policy of gender inclusivity
in Parliament” [Ballington 1999b:15]. The NP fell far short of its election
promises of gender equity.

Efforts to recruit and elect women into office increased with the 1999
elections, although with varied success. The ANC improved the chances of
electing women on its party-lists for 1999 (see Table 4). For that election, it moved to a system of having every third position on the list occupied by a woman (Ballington 1999d). Therein, the ANC ensured the election of women, regardless of the party’s popularity. This new ranking system, combined with the increase in the ANC percentage of the vote overall, led to a slight increase in women’s representation for the party in 1999. More importantly, it symbolically represents that women’s position in the party is solidified at the national level. The pre-1994 election promises by ANC leaders—promises that had strategically been secured by the ANC Women’s League—are now clearly entrenched in the electoral process.

For the 1999 elections, the United Democratic Party also implemented a policy of specifying gender on its candidate lists. The United Democratic Movement was the only new party to gain seats in the 1999 election. Bantu Holomisa had founded it in 1997. He had been a high-ranking and popular ANC member, but after he had publicly criticized corruption within the ANC, the party expelled him.

Of the parties reporting their national lists, five—ACDP, ANC, FF, IFP, and PAC—increased the percentage of women on their national and regional lists. One particularly important observation by gender advocates in South Africa in their examination of the composition of the ANC party-list for the 1999 elections was that several women who had worked hard for gender equality had actually fallen in the rankings. Noting that an exclusive focus on gender quotas may obscure the quality of women’s commitment to gender issues, Alice Coetzee relates the fears of many gender advocates, who note that in fact, while the women’s numbers in parliament actually improved in 1999, “[a] central concern was that MPs who do take up gender issues, like Pregs Govender (46) and Nozizwe Madlala Routledge (79) were far too low down” on the list (Coetzee 1999:2). According to Shireen Hassim of Wits University, “taking up gender issues is not the best way for a woman to increase mobility within the party” (Coetzee 1999:2).

Impact of Increase in Representation

The ANC’s commitment to having one-third of its seats filled by women has accomplished two notable objectives. First, it has greatly increased women’s numerical representation in the national government, which has brought, and will continue to bring, international support and approval. One senior member of the ANC explained the logic behind the quota:

Essentially what we have managed to do is begun to make women visible. I think that is an important thing. It’s not that there have never been competent women. It’s just that they were invisible. And by making a conscious effort by way of the ANC quota—that was at a political level. But perhaps more importantly, by the way women organized, the way
they impinged on the negotiations, the way they conducted themselves. All these made an impact. Women put themselves on the national agenda. No one could deny them that. (Gouws 1996)

Phyllis, a member of a predominantly white opposition party, agreed with the positive change in atmosphere following the transition, though she was concerned about the dangers of quotas on institutional capacity:

I must say I have a concern that empowerment has tended to take the form of visible affirmative action of the decorative kind. I have been a proponent of affirmative action, as we have chosen to call it; positive action is really a better way of describing it. But I have been a proponent of it at some cost to myself politically, because inside this kind of philosophy that I come from, interventionism isn’t the natural departing point. And so I have been really worried to see people brought in on the wrong sort of affirmative action, and I think it is such an easy way for a new government in a society like this to demonstrate change. You put a lot of new faces in various places. And it is too easy if you are not following the proper route of making sure the people you put in have whatever training of skills you need to do their jobs. Otherwise it becomes counterproductive, and they always end up with a greater sense of inadequacy, which compounds the problem. . . . Take the case of the women, for example, where the ANC decided before the election to have thirty percent of the women on its list—a quota, in effect—which we warned them against the dangers. And now that we are seventh in the world, about a quarter female, and that is fine and dandy. And it does have a certain critical-mass-type effect on the atmosphere in a place—which I think must have implication for how well we will function or not. (Cope 1996)

The second, and more lasting, impact of the quota is that it has successfully pressured other political parties to increase the number of women on their party-lists. This research conditionally supports Richard Matland and Donley T. Studlar’s [1996] theory of party contagion. They postulate that women’s-representation levels increase more rapidly within multi-member proportional representation systems because parties within such systems respond more quickly to the pressure of a rival party’s nomination of women.

While women in opposition parties would not directly say they supported the quota, most agreed with the ANC’s position on gender equality and would have liked to see the number of women in office increased. Women in the opposition parties have been calling for increased numbers,
and the ANC’s success has assisted this call. A male delegate from an opposition party stated his party would have more women in the future. He stated its ANC opponents strategically and effectively criticized their low numbers and merit policy: “When we said ‘We decide on merit,’ they said, ‘Oh, so you haven’t got women who are capable.’ It is window dressing, but under the circumstances we must do it” (Marais 1997). Women from the ANC found the pressure points for members of the opposition.

This was a frequent exchange between members of the ANC and members of opposition parties such as the NP, IFP, FF, ACDP, and DP. Women in parliament were also actively redefining the conception of merit. During a debate on an appropriation bill for the Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry, as reported in the National Assembly Debate on Vote, No. 36 [28 May 1996:1760], N. R. Shope criticized the ministry for its lack of diversity. A member of the opposition who opposes affirmative action countered her critiques:

Mrs. N.R. Shope: The reality [is] that women in rural areas still walk many kilometres to fetch water and carry water on their heads. This has a direct effect on the health of women in South Africa. The weight that they carry has implications for later life, when they develop backache and all sorts of diseases related to that strain. . . . [There are] places where water supply is still something that is being talked about, but is far from a reality. . . . Of the large number of staff members that we have there, there are only two Black chief directors. With water being a problem that directly faces women, in particular African women, I would expect, in that department, to see more faces of African women who are supposed to take decisions on the problems facing them. I hope that when we come to the next appointments, this department will consider women, African women in particular.

Mr. C. M. George: On merit!

Mrs. N.R. Shope: Yes on merit. We have merit. We have managed, without all the things that others have had, to bring our children up without easy access to water. We are still doing it today and we can decide our fate.

Shope asserts that African women’s lives, their experiences as caregivers and laborers, are the credentials they bring to office. She goes even further to assert that these credentials are more meritorious than white South African men’s experiences. Black South African women, in Shope’s estimation, should have a central role in making decisions affecting water policy for rural African women.

Women in opposition parties recognized that the ANC’s quota was helping the gender imbalances in their own parties. A woman from a pre-
dominantly white party stated that the increase in the number of women within her party was due to pressure from the ANC numbers:

We realized there was competition here. [My party,] I am afraid, hasn’t really taken the initiative on pushing women into positions, because part of our position has always been against affirmative action, for merit. But I said to our leader the other day, “Is it our view that there are very few women of merit, or what?” So it cuts both ways. Women are coming on tremendously in our party as far as local government . . . provincial legislatures. . . . It has had an impact. I suppose I am a bit of a pioneer of this in our party because I have always spoken up, and I have always gotten a lot of flack for it. But our leader has always supported me . . . and encouraged me to make a big thing of it, which is fine. I think he knows what the political realities are. And particularly in the black community pushing for women is important. My perception is that black women have been more oppressed in everything—the domestic context—had a double-whammy discrimination on basis of gender and color . . . We are against the quota system, but it does seem to be the only thing that really works. [Van Rooyen 1997]

Beyond the rhetorical promises of women’s increased representation, the results of the 1999 elections give marginal support to Matland and Studlar’s theory [see Table 2]. In numbers of Members of Parliament within the National Assembly, the ANC continued to lead the parties, with 36.5 percent of its seats held by women, an increase from 34.3 percent in 1994. Several parties, including the ACDP, the DP, and the PAC, increased their representation of women. The ACDP, which had no women in office after the 1994 elections, now has 33.3 percent women. Two parties, the IFP and the NP, fell in their representation of women. As stated earlier, these decreases may be related to the significant drop in the overall number of seats won by these parties from 1994, since both parties increased the percentage of women on their regional lists. Removing the ANC representatives from consideration, this also contributes to an absolute decrease in the number of women in parliament, from 27 of 149 [18.1 percent in 1994] to 22 of 134 [16.4 percent in 1999]. Therefore, the proliferation of minor parties in the 1999 elections, parties that took a smaller number of seats and filled them with men, contributed to an overall decline in the number of women in opposition parties taken as a whole. Clearly, the impact of contagion may be seen in several parties, especially those that held their ground or increased their seats in parliament, such as the DP and the ACDP. The impact of contagion on parties that lost seats in 1999 is less evident when looking only at the actual percentages of women in office, although contagion may be seen in the composition of the actual party-lists.
Conclusion

Once a full acceptance of women’s position in office has been achieved, the question must again shift to ensuring they have an equal voice within the parliamentary structure. The process of making women visible in the formal political sphere is one piece of the complex story of gender politics in South Africa. There are significant differences among women in their ability to operate within the formal sphere of political office (Britton 2001). The current literature indicates that women are also facing numerous obstacles to their full and equal participation in parliament (Ballington 1999b; Britton 1997). Accordingly, future directions for research will need to ascertain what, if any, substantive, qualitative impact on policy the new influx of women in office has in fact had. Such analysis is clearly outside the scope of this paper; however, several key lessons can be gained from this examination of women’s path to parliament.

The antiapartheid struggle demonstrated the integral importance of women in South African politics. Women in exile learned from their international experience that struggles for racial equality and national liberation did not necessarily lead to a similar understanding of or commitment to gender equality. During this time of national upheaval, South African women worked as rapidly as possible within their parties, the constitution, and the electoral system. They accomplished several key goals. First, they established a viable, unified coalition of historically combative organizations. Utilizing their fear of exclusion from politics and their history of gender subordination, the member groups of the WNC overcame past distrust and tension, developed a national platform for action, collaborated on substantive policy issues, and raised awareness of the status and role of women nationally. Second, from the foundation of the WNC, women formed cross-party bargaining teams to pressure their way into the constitutional negotiations. Once in place, women consistently and successfully incorporated their needs into the constitution. Third, South African women utilized the groundswell of the emerging women’s movement to pressure their parties for internal affirmative-action measures. By making the argument that putting more women on the party-list attracts more votes, women were strategically able to demand quotas and/or recruitment and training of women candidates.

Now, several years into the new dispensation, each party has publicly acknowledged the legitimacy and need for women in politics. Each party has committed to increasing the number of women in office, either through the use of party-list quotas or some other institutional mechanism for affirmative action. While the long-term results of such efforts remain to be seen, there has, as a whole, been an increase of women in national office.

The South African model demonstrates that, unlike many other similar situations in the international context, cross-party collaboration is possible and may be successful given the right conditions. During a time of national political transformation, women may be able to secure significant
gains by developing a broad, flexible coalition that allows for individual group differences. Additionally, such coalitions seem to function best when there is a shared identity of subordination and/or a shared belief in the necessity of group mobilization. The women’s movement during the transition focused on substantive policy issues, not simply procedural matters. This level of policy focus will be difficult to sustain within the confines of daily parliamentary life, when party identities assume paramount importance. Women were able to use their group identity to make demands for substantial changes within their own parties. Women of various parties have developed powerful and successful strategies and networks that may be used again and again to force changes and push for an increased commitment to gender equity.

Most importantly, how will these commitments be manifested in post-1999 elections? A review is currently underway in South Africa as to whether or not to reform, revise, or even scrap the current election rules and system. The main critics of the current pure-list proportional-representation system argue that there is no direct accountability from Members of Parliament to constituents since members are elected at large. A main counterproposal advocated by smaller parties is for a mixed proportional-representation system, where some percentage of the seats are elected through lists and some percentage through specific constituency areas. Ballington [1999a] reports that gender is currently not a major factor in these debates and discussions. The result of the electoral-system review may be in fact to retain the current system; however, that gender is not a major consideration in these discussions, as Ballington has found, illustrates that the battle to make gender a mainstream consideration is far from over.

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NOTES

1. Kathleen Sheldon argues that post-liberation politics in Mozambique have shown the liberation leaders’ commitments to gender equality to be limited: political inequality is
3. For examples in Norway, see Jill M. Bystydzienski (1988, 1992); for examples in Scotland, see Alice Brown et al. (2002); for examples in the Middle East, see O. Najjar (1992).

4. This analysis finds that there is a global women’s movement being forged, involving international women’s conferences and advances in communication technology. Women are now starting international networks to learn from each other’s successes and failures.

5. Gay W. Seidman argues that South Africa may be the ideal case study for an examination of the impact of the powerful and articulate new international women’s movement. Women returning from exile who had been “introduced to new feminist ideas and publications” (1999:295) could bring these ideas to bear on the new South Africa.

6. For such an example, see Cock (1991:184).

7. All interview quotes are direct transcriptions. As many of the women interviewed are not native English speakers, many such excerpts contain non-standard constructions. Certain phrases and errors are textually awkward, but this is the only way to preserve their ideas and maintain validity within the interview process. Editorial changes in the transcripts are enclosed in square brackets. For the women’s protection, I did my own transcriptions and have used randomly assigned western pseudonyms with regionally appropriate family names.

8. Kemp et al. (1995) detail the tensions between the African National Party and the National Party. NP affiliates argued that the ANC had captured the national leadership of the WNC. Conversely, ANC affiliates argued that the regional leadership of the WNC was held by the NP.

9. Unfortunately, the data from the WNC appears to indicate an urban bias in the research project. The data on urban/rural bias are skewed because there is no category for peri-urban setting; therefore, even areas such as the homelands immediately outside an urban area—areas that retain full traditional cultural and customary law and lack any modern infrastructure—could be included in the “urban” and not “rural” category. The researchers attempted to control for this variation within the selection of their focus-group research (WNC 1994:121–188).

10. For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Kemp et al. (1995). Member organizations could not decide between weighting votes for the size of affiliates, which would disadvantage small groups, or pursuing a single vote system, which would disadvantage large groups. The single-vote system would have privileged the white and elite populations, since many leaders of the organizations were whites.

11. Seidman (1999) argues that such unity was possible because of the particular historic moment that occurred for women during the transition to democracy. While noting the widespread, and the government has had to try to increase female participation each election (Sheldon 1994:41–46). Sita Ranchod-Nilsson presents a similar story from Zimbabwe, where “government’s policies affecting women can, at best, be described as ambiguous” (1994:82), despite women’s role in the liberation movement. Catherine Scott presents evidence that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola worked within the traditional Marxist framework, which sees women’s emancipation related to the struggle against capitalism and colonialism, not patriarchy; this severely limited women’s calls for liberation and restricted their activities to the traditional household sphere, and the multifaceted role they had played in the revolution was reduced to the view that they were “passive victims” (1994:99).
propensity of women in the antiapartheid struggle to place gender second to national liberation, Seidman posits that women were able to bring the gender struggle forward once the path was cleared for the new dispensation.

12. Although harder to measure, members of the WNC assert that there is a fourth reason for their unity: a shared commitment to process. Many of the leaders at the forefront of the WNC had been in exile and had witnessed the utility of women’s mobilization and coalition building; however, even non-exile women who worked within South African advocacy groups and welfare organizations were institutionally and experientially aware of the need and usefulness of empowering women and providing a space for women’s participation. Accordingly, as the WNC progressed, process became as important as outcome. Within all its meetings, research, and activities, the WNC maintained a “model of transformation (in which) women themselves are the principal players and the Coalition’s role was that of catalyst” (WNC 1994:21). Accordingly, the creation of the Women’s Charter had two simultaneous and mutually reinforcing methods: a consciousness-raising campaign, and a scholarly and rigorous research project, designed to assess South Africa women’s status and needs.

13. This representation of women went into effect in 1993, when CODESA was replaced with the Multi-Party Negotiating Council.

14. Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC secretary-general during the transition, distinguished himself as a principal architect of the new constitution and was recognized as a formidable negotiator.

15. The ANC Commission for the Emancipation of Women (1993) released a statement communicating their outrage at the attack. To the commission, the attack symbolized the conflation of racism and sexism as mutually reinforcing systems of oppression. Women delegates and journalists were the primary targets for physical and verbal abuse.

16. Albertyn (1994) delineates one such instance: the WNC and other women’s organizations mobilized against a provision in the interim constitution that would have exempted the bill of rights, and therein human rights and gender equity, from areas and peoples still governed under customary law.

17. Kemp et al. (1995) outline these conflicts: smaller women’s organizations have wanted to maintain the coalition because it gives them a platform and a level of influence they would be unable to secure on their own; larger groups feel the coalition has served its purpose and may inhibit their individual organizational goals.

18. There is some evidence that it is party magnitude instead of district magnitude that matters the most in this instance. For an extended discussion, see Matland (1993).

19. Okin (1979) counters this line of thinking by asserting that women cannot simply be added to the traditional categories and political systems to achieve parity; merely changing election rules and shifting institutional mechanisms to accommodate women may prove insufficient in rectifying the political exclusion and domination of women.

20. For example, De Klerk and the NP worked to guarantee minority veto power and some form of power sharing with the dominant party. As internal boycotts, mass action, and international sanctions rang the death-knell of apartheid, the white elite did not imagine that an end of apartheid would mean the end of white supremacy or control: “while quite prepared to abolish apartheid and remove other obstacles to negotiations, De Klerk did not envisage competitive elections and a system that could reduce the NP to a perpetual opposition party; . . . for him negotiations would only be about power-sharing” (Giliomee 1995:93). Opposition leaders within the ANC worked to secure an electoral system that would nullify such minority power, as it was seen to be an extension of minority domination. In fact, in the years building to the
negotiations, the ANC in exile “commonly thought that the transition to black rule would follow after the complete breakdown of the apartheid regime; . . . ending oppression would take the form of decolonization” (Giliomee 1995:95).

21. Jung and Shapiro (1995) predicted that the groundwork laid by the interim constitution would preclude the eventual and sustained consolidation of democracy in South Africa because the constitution lacked provisions for a viable democratic opposition and instead pushed for a government of national unity above all else. Similarly, Giliomee (1995) believes that the prospects for a democratic consolidation are few. These assessments are countered best by Thomas Koelble and Andrew Reynolds, who assert “consensus-oriented constitution is the only path by which South Africa will attain a stable democratic regime; . . . there is a much stronger case to be made for the consensual democracy as the original brand, and the type of government that best reflects the democratic traditions and cultural norms” (1996:221, 226).

22. The literature on district magnitude has more recently come into question. Welch and Studlar (1990) found its effects to be modest at best. Additionally, Darcy et al. (1994) assert that district magnitude has no effect whatsoever. There is some evidence that it is party magnitude instead of district magnitude that matters the most in this instance. This confusion may be best explained by Matland (1993, 1995) and Matland and Taylor (1997), who find that it is party magnitude—the likelihood of a party to win seats in a district—that determines the impact of district magnitude. It matters less that a district is large if a party expects to win only a few seats there; if the party competition is fierce in that district, the same gender-bias tendencies seen in single-member districts occur.

23. For an extended discussion of the internal party tensions and struggles for gender equity before 1990, see Seidman (1999).

24. Closed party-lists are party-lists that are rank-ordered and unalterable; open lists indicate voters may choose from a list presented by a party.

25. Dene Smuts was the only person interviewed who wanted to have her name used in the project. While I have used extensive quotes from her interview, I have chosen to protect her identity in all other cases. I have used her name here because, as she is the only woman representative of the Democratic Party at the national level, readers will know who she is by the content of the quote. Further, this quote is part of common knowledge and at times complementary of her party. She was open to having her name used because she sees herself and her party as having an important role as an opposition to the ANC majority.

26. The NP and the DP did not create national lists for the 1999 elections, but the DP increased its actual percentage of women Members of Parliament, from 14.3 percent to 15.8 percent. The actual percentage of NP women Members of Parliament decreased slightly from 1994 to 1999, reflecting perhaps the party’s loss of seats more than any decision to have fewer women in office. The composition of the NP’s regional lists reveals that there was an increase of women on the lists, from 11.4 percent in 1994 to 18.4 percent in 1999.

REFERENCES CITED


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<th>Senate (National Council of Provinces)</th>
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<td>Number interviewed</td>
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### Table 3

Women on party-lists, 1994 elections

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<th>Party</th>
<th>Women National List</th>
<th>Women Regional List</th>
<th>Number of MPs</th>
<th>Number of Women MPs</th>
<th>Women as Proportion of MPs</th>
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*Source: Ballington, Julie. 1999b.*
Table 4
Women on party-lists, 1999 elections

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<th>Number of Women MPs*</th>
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Source: Ballington, Julie. 1999c.